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John Drabinski

The possibility of an ethical
politics
From peace to liturgy

Abstract This essay examines the possibility of developing an ethical
politics out of the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas’ own work does not
accomplish this kind of politics. He opts instead for a politics of peace,
which, as this essay argues, falls short of the demands of the ethical. Thus,
this essay both provides an account of Levinas’ own politics and develops
resources from within Levinas’ own work for thinking beyond that politics.
An alternative, liturgical politics is sketched out. In a liturgical politics, law
must be thought on a redistributive model. Redistribution, it is argued,
responds more adequately to the extravagant generosity of ethics than the
neutral ‘droits de l’homme’ developed in Levinas’ political philosophy.
Key words

ethics · law · Levinas · liturgy · peace · politics · redistribution

I cannot live in society on the basis of this one-to-one responsibility alone.
(Levinas)

It has become all but commonplace among Continental philosophers to
demand that Levinasians produce a politics. This demand typically performs a twofold function: to point out both the limits of both Levinas’
pure Hebraism1 and the movement from the singular Other to le tiers.2
Though I am somewhat suspicious of these demands – as they often
mask a call for a certain kind of politics – it is nevertheless true that
Levinasians must be sensitive to how the very matters of obligation indicate the horizon of the political. If Levinas wants to contend that Europe
is constituted by the simultaneous intertwining of and rupture between
‘the Bible and the Greeks’3 – tantamount to the singularity of Hebraic
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wisdom and the universality of Athenian law in politics – then an
account of the relation between ethics and the state is imperative.
Furthermore, because the demand for a politics emerges from concrete
exigencies, those perplexed by Levinas’ now famous comment, that his
‘definition of the other is completely different’ from one inclusive of
Israel’s most proximal other, the Palestinian (EP, 294), must feel an even
more urgent demand. The question, then, is quite straightforward: is a
Levinasian ethics destined for such a closed conception of the neighbor,
or could politics, setting out from ethics, be thought otherwise?
The present reflections set out from Levinas and seek an ethical politics. This politics must be distinguished from Levinas’ own articulation
of a politics of peace. Is there a possibility, beginning within Levinas’
thought, for a legitimate ethical politics? Precisely what this politics
might look like from a Levinasian perspective remains an altogether
open question. Although part of our task here will be to explore what
an ethical politics might look like, we will ask if such a politics is necessarily absent from Levinas’ own account of a politics of peace. Thus, we
will engage the political in a manner both consonant with and foreign
to Levinas’ own reflections on the matter. This engagement entails four
basic tasks. The first task is to illuminate the ‘problem’ of politics within
the ethical; the second, to examine Levinas’ attempts to negotiate the
movement from the ethical to the political. The sections on these two
tasks highlight three structures: the gap between ethics and politics, the
necessity of their relation, and the passage that makes reconciling gap
and necessity possible. The third task, in light of the relation between
ethics and politics, is to examine Levinas’ passage from ethics to politics
with a critical eye. In the fourth and final task, we will outline a
Levinasian phenomenology of political space responsive to our question
of an ethical politics. In the two concluding sections, on the third and
fourth tasks we will have occasion both to voice hesitation with regard
to Levinas’ deployment of politics and to extend our considerations
beyond the conservative limitations of that deployment.

I
The motivation for a critique of Levinas’ ‘pure Hebraism’ lies in the
putatively contradictory logic of ethics and politics, a contradiction that
renders a morally legitimated politics structurally impossible. Gillian
Rose puts it directly when she writes of Levinas’ ‘Buddhist Judaism’ that
‘offers an extreme version of Athens versus Jerusalem’.4 The Buddhist
character of Levinas’ Hebraism – his resolute insistence on the first position of the singular face – is betrayed by the vigilant work of ethics in
the shadow of the state. Ethics, working within the particularity of moral
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consciousness, is always a transcendence of politics. ‘Responsibility’,
Rose writes, ‘is defined in this new ethics as “passivity beyond passivity,” which is inconceivable and not representable, because it takes place
beyond any city – even though Levinas insists that it is social and not
sacred.’5 Such a characterization of Levinas’ work is encouraged by the
‘Preface’ to Totality and Infinity. There, Levinas describes the task of
Totality and Infinity by setting the ethics of exteriority in opposition to
war and politics: ‘War does not manifest exteriority and the other as
other. . . . Morality will oppose politics in history’ (TeI, ix–x/21–2).
The opposition of morality to war and politics arises out of a logical
necessity. Politics is necessarily problematic for Levinas because it
demands terms opposed to those of the face-to-face relation. As Levinas
writes in his ‘Preface’ to the German translation of Totality and Infinity,
ethical transcendence is wholly the relation of unicity to unicity, the love
from stranger to stranger, which places ethics outside the generic idea of
community (PEA, 251). Politics as generic community, founded in a
general identity, disturbs the intimacy of the face-to-face pair by interjecting the universal between a relation of singulars. This interjection, in
the name of third parties, threatens to neutralize the troubled ground of
ethics and so trouble the matter of obligation itself. As one of Levinas’
first remarks on the problem makes clear, the relation of singularity to
singularity forms ‘a society of me and you. We are just among ourselves.
Third parties are excluded. A third man essentially disturbs this intimacy’ (MT, 31/30). In Totality and Infinity, Levinas will again underscore this troubling and disturbing presence of another, third party. The
character of disturbance marks the priority and purity of the ethical situation; the other party seems to arrive subsequent to the face-to-face.
Ethics is independent of the rules and laws of politics and the question
of social justice. This independence is established by the immediate
responsibility of the one for the Other. Levinas writes that ‘[r]esponsibility for the other is an immediacy antecedent to the questions [of politics], it is proximity. It is troubled and becomes a problem when a third
party enters’ (AE, 200/157). Despite its signification within the face-toface, the third party is problematic because it ‘is other than the neighbor, but also another neighbor, and also a neighbor of the other, and
not simply his fellow’ (AE, 200/157). The logic of ethics and politics
manifests a remarkable gap. The gap is opened up by the otherness of
the third, who is other than me and other than the face that faces the
moral I.
The face-to-face relation is always the relation of unicity to unicity.
Political matters, however, demand, of necessity, a language other than
that of the singular and the unique. This other language is necessary for
the simple reason that political questioning calls for media of neutral
problems: equality, comparison and reciprocity. The moral dimension of
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politics lies in the question of justice. As such, politics calls for a calculation of equal relations, and this calculation always works within the
neutral economy of representation. In ‘Peace and Proximity’, Levinas
writes that
. . . [t]he first question in the interhuman is the question of justice. . . . Comparison is superimposed onto my relation with the unique and the incomparable, and, in view of equity and equality, a weighing, a thinking, a
calculation, the comparison of incomparables. . . . [Subjectivity] enters with
the dignity of a citizen into the perfect reciprocity of political laws which
are essentially egalitarian or held to become so. (PeP, 148–9/168)

The egalitarian structures of the liberal state cannot account for the language of singularity. The structures that make equality possible are
superimposed onto the relation of unicity to unicity. I am a citizen only
under a general law, a law based in the comparison of incomparable singulars. It belongs to the very idea of law that it neutralizes the enigma
of the singular. Such is the fate of institutions.
The uniqueness of the face-to-face relation is not simply opposed to
the state as one logic to another. The ethical explicitly resists the state
and therein refuses suppression of its singularity. Levinas notes in ‘Ideology and Idealism’ that
. . . the relation to the Other, as a relation of responsibility, cannot be totally
suppressed, even when it takes the form of politics or warfare. Here it is
impossible to free myself by saying ‘it’s not my concern.’ There is no choice,
for it is always inescapably my concern. (IaI, 247)

The logic and concrete work of ethics resists the scope of political logic.
My relation to the Other ‘cannot be totally suppressed’. Singularity
resists universality. The work of obligation called for in the face-to-face
can neither be concealed nor expiated in the legalistic work of the state.
In this resistance, Levinas’ work both replays some essential features of
the conceptual conflict of Hebraism (City of Jerusalem) and Hellenism
(City of Athens) and restages something of the ancient confrontation
between Antigone and Kreon. The unsuppressable, potentially revolutionary and potentially destructive fact of a singular obligation stakes its
claim outside the boundary walls of the state. But, still, one may ask: if
Levinas claims ethics is sociality, does that not imply that politics is more
than something outside the ethical? Is not sociality always political, even
in its ethical signification?

II
What critics like Rose find objectionable in Levinas’ separation of ethics
from politics is the supposed failure to think the relation of the ethical
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to the political. On this account, Levinas’ privileging of ethics over politics fails to see how the logics of heteronomy and Hebraism presuppose
the very structures they put into question. So, this is a failure born of
naivety. The state, so the criticism goes, is both a factical and an essential necessity. To exclude an account of the state from ethics is to forget
a – perhaps the – condition of the ethical relation and to evade the
anxious risks of political community in a gesture of naivety.6
But this clearly sells the Levinasian prerogative short. Levinas will
admit, with his own qualifications, that the human is animal politique,
‘a political animal’ (MT, 35/33). While he surely does not, and cannot,
make politics equiprimordial with ethics,7 it is altogether wrong to say
that Levinas does not think the relation between the two. In his first take
on the relation of ethics to politics, the juxtaposition of the singular face
and the universality of the law opens up a gap. The face signifies without
context. Politics is the face contextualized and compared – the face as
citizen. Yet, the Other is always an Other with others. The call to the
necessity of politics is already within the face-to-face, something that
signals justice, a question of the public realm, as necessary. Levinas
writes:
But in the real world there are many others. When others enter, each of
them is external to myself, problems arise. Who is closest to me? Who is
the Other? Perhaps something has already occurred between them. We must
investigate carefully. Legal justice is required. There is need for a State. (IaI,
247)

The politics of the state is at once what opposes ethics and what is necessary. If one cannot live in society on the basis of one-to-one responsibility alone, then some kind of politics is necessary. Between politics and
ethics, there is a gap and the necessity of relation. The gap is manifest
in the opposed logics. The necessity is manifest in something like the facticity of my sociality. There are many others and they command me to
be a political animal.
What is the sense of this necessity, and how might it be related to
ethics? For, if ethics is unsuppressable by politics and politics cannot
assume, correct, or substitute itself for the work of ethics, then what
would be the status of politics inside or outside the scope of obligation?
This is posed by Levinas as the question of the relation of ethics to politics, a question imposed by the necessity of legal justice. It is quite simple:
is the legal justice of the state necessary for protection of one from
another, or is it necessary as an extension of my responsibility for the
neighbor? Is legal justice born of violence, or of goodness? Levinas puts
it plainly:
[I]t is very important to know whether the state, society, law, and power
are required because man is a beast to his neighbor (homo homini lupus)
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or because I am responsible for my fellow. It is very important to know
whether the political order defines man’s responsibility or merely restricts
his bestiality. It is very important, even if the conclusion is that all of us
exist for the sake of the state, the society, the law.8

These remarks confirm the tension inherent in the relation. In ‘Peace and
Proximity’, Levinas attempts to alleviate that tension by insisting on the
relation as one of genetic order. When Levinas writes in Totality and
Infinity that ‘behind the straight line of the law, the land of goodness
extends infinite and unexplored’ (TeI, 223/245), the implication is that
the goodness of ethics cannot be subsumed under the labor of politics.
The function of ethics, of goodness, is to remind politics of its origin and
the place of its justification. The political practice of the state is measured
by what is generated by face-to-face obligations. This measuring
command of the facing relation is guaranteed by the question of origin.
Ethics puts politics in question as both other than politics and the foundation of its justice. This genetic relation is important to recall, for the
danger of politics lies in its capacity to claim itself as its own center.
Levinas reminds us that politics left to itself ‘bears a tyranny within itself’
(TeI, 276/300). Or, as he writes in an immensely important passage from
‘Peace and Proximity’, we can recall politics to its origin in peace. Precisely because the state risks claiming an originary character, Levinas
writes that
. . . it seemed to us important to recall peace and justice as their origin,
justification, and measure; to recall that this justice, which can legitimate
them ethically . . . is not a natural and anonymous legality governing the
human masses. . . . Nothing would be able to withdraw itself from the
control of the responsibility of the ‘one for the other,’ which delineates the
limit of the State and does not cease to appeal to the vigilance of persons
who would not be satisfied with the simple subsumption of cases under a
general rule. (PeP, 149–50/168–9).

The state is dangerous when it claims an anonymous foundation to law,
namely, a foundation grounded in a generic communal identity. But law
does not arise from an originally indifferent situation. Law, in some
manner of appealing to ground, looks to the peace of the relation of
unicity to unicity for its foundation. ‘Justice’, Levinas will say, ‘demands
and lays the foundation of the state [exige et fonde l’État]’ (DU, 216).
This appeal to the ethical relation as the ground of law calls for what
Levinas terms a ‘phenomenology of the rights of man’. The rights of the
human, the universality of equality and comparison, ‘are based on an
original sense of the right, or the sense of an original right’ (DH,
175/116).9 This original right is concretely produced in the relation to
the Other: the unique and the singular. This ethical relation is what the
ethical state, practicing the politics of peace, takes as its model. Levinas
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writes: ‘Metaphysics therefore leads us to the accomplishment of the I
as unicity by relation to which the work of the State must be situated,
and which it must take as a model [doit se situer et se modeler]’ (TeI,
277/300). The universality of the state is not self-sufficient. Rather, the
source of its egalitarian principles is manifest first as the duty commanded by the singular face. Levinas writes in ‘The Rights of Man and
the Rights of the Other’ that
. . . the rights of man manifest themselves concretely to consciousness as the
rights of the other, for which I am answerable. Their original manifestation
as rights of the other person and as duty for an I, as my fraternal duty –
that is the phenomenology of the rights of man. (DH, 187/125)

Ethics has a twofold relation to politics: ethics is both the phenomenological ground of politics and, as the ground on which politics is built,
is always capable of calling it into question. Ethics holds an interruptive
power in relation to politics, even as it grounds. This interruptive effect
derives from its position in the order of priority.
Politics left to itself is tyrannical. Still, if we situate ethics at the basis
of the just state, then a relation is forged between ethics and politics that
opens up the possibility of an ethical politics. But, the face-to-face itself
brings up a paradox: there is a gap between ethics and politics and a
necessity to both. This paradox is resolved, in part, by the introduction
of the figure of le tiers – the third party. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas
writes that
. . . [t]he third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other. . . . It is not that
there would first be the face, and then the being it manifests or expresses
would concern himself with justice; the epiphany of the face qua face opens
humanity. . . . The presence of the face – the infinity of the Other – is destitution, the presence of the third party (that is, of the whole of humanity
that looks at us). (TeI, 188/213)

This intertwining of the face and the third provides something like a resolution to the paradoxical relation of ethics to politics. If this paradox
is the simultaneity of gap and necessity, then it can be resolved only by
a figure of passage. This passage is necessary, for, without a passage,
without a relation of ethics and politics, politics is left to itself. Safe from
the weight of the ethical, such a politics leads to tyranny and the primacy
of war. The third party, which hearkens back to Aristotle’s third man
argument in the Metaphysics, functions as this passage. In an important
claim, Levinas will say that the third looks at me in the face of the Other
originally and not as a supplement. The third party already points to the
possibility of an ethical politics, as the third relates the ethical to the universality of the state immanently. Levinas puts it this way:
In the measure that the face of the Other relates us with the third party, the
metaphysical relation of the I with the Other moves into the form of the
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We, aspires to a State, institutions, laws, which are the source of universality. (TeI, 276/300)

At this point, Levinas remarks that a politics left to itself is tyranny.
Without the relations of height described in the ethical, the state is
subject to the suspension of morality in war. The presence of the third
in the face-to-face, however, marks politics with the demands of moral
consciousness. The rights of the human, we might say, are always
already marked by the rights of the Other. Their reduction of the singularity of the Other to the ‘particularity of an individual of the genre
human, to the condition of a citizen’ is indispensable for politics. But,
this reduction does not make a clean break with its original situation.
This reduction, rather, is a movement of ‘derivation’ whose ‘imperative
motivation’ is to ‘inscribe’ the incomparable and unique right of the
Other human in the law (DU, 216).
The presence of the third signifies the point of passage from ethics
to politics, and thereby marks politics with ethics. The co-presence of
the face and the third signals the political in the (original) ethical situation. The third is the signification that makes the passage possible – the
indicative sign, as it were, of what transcends the given (politics is
beyond the face), while simultaneously being immanent to the given (the
third signals in the eyes of the Other). Levinas’ use of the third as the
signification of politics is phenomenologically important, as his analysis
has always adhered, methodologically, to the concrete. Levinas’ appeal
to the concrete means, in this context, that politics cannot simply be constructed out of ethics. Politics must signify concretely within the ethical;
the third must indicate itself in the face of the Other. The third intertwined with the face performs precisely this signification. Levinas’ turn
to the signification of the third is, as Critchley puts it, ‘the attempt to
traverse the passage from ethics to politics without reducing the dimension of transcendence’.10 The signification effects a doubling of
discourse, manifest in what Levinas calls the ‘prophetic word’ of
‘monotheism’. The invocation of the prophetic word fills out what is left
unexplained when Levinas says: ‘language is justice.’ Levinas tells us in
‘De l’Unicité’ that the prophetic voice reminds the judgement of the state
that the human face is concealed in the idea of the citizen. Justice,
derived from ethics, demands the protection and first position of singularity, and so opposes the neutered disposition of the law of citizenship.
The prophetic voice recalls the unicity that ‘precedes every genre or is
liberated from every genre’ (DU, 216).
The prophetic word of monotheism constitutes what Critchley calls
the ‘double community of fraternitas’.11 The prophetic word doubles
community by simultaneously affirming law as generality and liberating unicity from generality. The prophetic word expresses the
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movement from law to singularity and from singularity to law. Levinas
writes that
. . . the prophetic word responds to the epiphany of the face, doubles every
discourse, not as discourse about moral themes, but as an irreducible movement of a discourse which is essentially aroused by the epiphany of the face
inasmuch as it attests to the presence of the third party, of humanity as a
whole, in the eyes that look at me. (TeI, 188/213)

The prophet of monotheism, speaking the word of God – said, for
Levinas, in the face – puts humanity under an ethical law. This law is
ethical because it refuses to undermine the priority of the face of the
Other who commands. The ethical law says community in the face of
the Other, which is, in Levinas’ account, the concretion of the Divine.
Freedom in fraternity affirms the responsibility of the one-for-the-Other.
Indeed, in his ‘Preface’ to the German translation of Totality and Infinity, Levinas puts fraternity and the sociality of peace immediately alongside the relations of unicity to unicity, the love ‘from stranger to stranger’
(PEA, 251). ‘The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other’ confirms
this link:
Should not the fraternity that is in the motto of the republic be discerned
in the prior non-indifference of the one for the other, in that original goodness in which freedom is embedded, and in which the justice of the rights
of man takes on an immutable significance and stability, better than those
guaranteed by the state? A freedom in fraternity, in which the responsibility
of one-for-the-other is affirmed, and through which the rights of man manifest themselves concretely to consciousness as the rights of the Other, for
which I am answerable. (DH, 187/125)

If, as Levinas will say in Otherwise than Being, justice is the birth of
consciousness, then this consciousness of the rights of the human (universality) made concrete as the rights of the other (singularity) is our
first, primordial political subjectivity.12 Primordial political subjectivity
– the relation of fraternity – is a relation to the universal in the concrete.
This subjectivity ‘lives from’ the identical significative locus of the Other
and the third.

III
Political subjectivity outlines what is necessary for a legitimate politics.
The political subjectivity of fraternitas is a community of difference that
stands under the protection of the universality of law. Law and its universality, however, are not established in the name of order. That is, the
universality of law is neither an identification of a shared identity nor
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required by humanity’s beastly nature. It is, rather, a law established in
the name of singularity. Against the tradition that grounds the universality of law in an extension of my interests, Levinas’ law establishes a
protection of the rights of the singular Other. A politics whose universality is answerable to and derived from the singularity of the Other is
a legitimate politics. The legitimacy of this politics of peace lies in the
justificatory relation of the rights of the human to the rights of the Other.
Justification flows in one direction: from the Other to the law. ‘I seek
this peace,’ Levinas says, ‘not for me but for the Other’ (IEI, 196). Peace
for the Other is a politics justified by its protection of the singularity of
the Other. A politics of peace secures the Other’s place in the sun. Peace,
one could say, gives the world back to the Other.
But is a politics of peace sufficiently an ethical politics? That is, does
the excess of giving, what Levinas will call the ‘extravagant generosity’
of the for-the-Other (cf. DU, 216), inhere in this politics of peace? My
contention here is that it does not. The incompatibility of the politics of
peace with an ethical politics is due to what I will call Levinas’ ‘conservatism’. By conservatism, I mean to indicate Levinas’ failure to question the roots of the idea of politics, as well as his failure to practice a
radical phenomenology. I can see this failure and conservatism in its
twofold appearance: Levinas’ practice of politics and his articulation of
its structure.
To begin, let us first recall Levinas’ comments on Palestinian–Israeli
relations, which speak to his own political practice. This political issue
is a factual instance, a case of putting the politics of peace into action,
and betrays much about Levinas’ account of politics. In this context,
Levinas first explains what he understands to be the accomplished political state. He claims that the necessity of
. . . a State in the fullest sense of the term, a State with an army and arms,
an army which can have a deterrent and if necessary a defensive significance
. . . is ethical – indeed, it’s an old ethical idea which commands us precisely
to defend our neighbors. My people and my kin are still my neighbors.
When you defend the Jewish people, you defend your neighbor; and every
Jew in particular defends his neighbor when he defends. (EP, 292)

Such a delineation of the notion of neighbor must strike any reader of
Levinas as, at best, peculiar, if not outright problematic. Has not Levinas
long since insisted on the singularity of the neighbor beyond any context
or identity? Does this not violate the wisdom of the biblical command
to welcome the Stranger? How have we come from Widow, Orphan,
Stranger – figures that dominate Totality and Infinity – to ‘people’ and
‘kin’? Perhaps troubled by this, the interviewer Shlomo Malka turns to
the obvious question: does not the Palestinian–Israeli relation mimic the
logic of the Other in the Same, the stateless in the state, the Stranger to
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s/he who governs, and so ‘for the Israeli, isn’t the “other” above all the
Palestinian’? To this question, Levinas responds that
. . . [m]y definition of the Other is completely different. The Other is the
neighbor, who is not necessarily kin, but who can be. And in this sense, if
you are for the Other, you are for the neighbor. But if your neighbor attacks
another neighbor or treats him unjustly, what can you do? Then alterity
takes on another character, in alterity we can find an enemy, or at least then
we are faced with the problem of knowing who is right and who is wrong,
who is just and who is unjust. There are people who are wrong. (EP, 294)

One cannot but see in this comment a failure of the extravagant generosity so elegantly and systematically articulated in Levinas’ ethics. The
possibility of being in kinship, the failure of which constitutes the Other
as enemy, establishes a boundary that bars the Palestinian from the work
of ethics. For Levinas, here, the political Other, the stateless in the state,
does not demand a generosity from the Same.
Now, it would be tempting, and perhaps even somewhat warranted,
to see this as a personal failure on Levinas’ part, reading this as born of
complex political and psychological urgencies. Surely, one must consider
that Levinas has witnessed intimately two of the West’s most horrifying
moral failures: Stalinist Russia and Hitler’s Germany. Further, one might
see this as a poor application of Levinas’ sense of law, a mistake corrected in a proper reapplication of the law of peace to the Palestinian
‘problem’. But these are two temptations to which we do not want to
succumb. Succumbing to them conceals what is most revealing about
Levinas’ comments. If taken seriously, these comments reveal a tendency
built into both Levinas’ construal of the politics of peace and, perhaps
most significantly, the passage from ethics to politics. It is therefore of
note that in a politically neutral, strictly philosophical context, Levinas
will still link peace with defense of the Other and Third. Consider what
he says in ‘The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other’:
This is a goodness in peace, which is also the exercise of a freedom, and in
which the I frees itself from its ‘return to self,’ from its auto-affirmation,
from its egotism of a being perservering in its being, to answer for the other,
precisely to defend the rights of the other man. (DH, 186/124–5)

At first glance, one might read this note as simply reiterating how the
universality of law protects the singular Other. However, when it is read
in light of his comments on the Palestinian as enemy, another picture
emerges. It becomes clear that Levinas identifies an intimacy between the
idea of peace and the idea of a defense of the Other. This defense of the
Other is undertaken in the name of the law and is thus motivated by the
comparison of incomparables. But comparison is not dis-interested.
(Recall that dis-interestedness is something of a pre-condition of ethics
for Levinas.) It would appear, rather, that this comparison is done in the
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name of a kind of kinship. The question ‘Who belongs to the law?’,
perhaps the very question Levinas’ work in ethics has long contested,
suddenly reappears in politics under another series of concepts: comparison, defense, kinship. Comparison, when thought in terms of
defense and kinship, is wholly interested.
This latter sense of comparison is also indispensable for Levinas’
politics. It makes determination of both which neighbor is ‘right’ and
who calls for defense possible. Levinas is clear what clue we have for
such comparisons: the ‘first language’ of the ‘wish for peace’. He writes
that
. . . [n]on-indifference and goodness of responsibility: these are not neutral,
midway between love and hostility. They must be conceived on the basis of
the meeting, in which the wish for peace – or goodness – is the first language. (DH, 186/125)

Meeting, language, peace: this opens the question of who meets, who
speaks this language, and s/he for whom peace is sought. The question
of who meets is necessarily a question of who is my neighbor. Who
speaks the language of the wish for peace is necessarily a question of
who ‘counts’ in my giving. For whom is this peace sought? Here Levinas
makes it clear that it is only sought for those who ‘fit’, so to speak, under
the universality of the law. Peace, we could say, obtains only for those
who fit the rhythms of political life.
If Levinas understands politics in this manner, a politics consistent
in both practice and structural account of that practice, then we must
ask further: what sort of signification makes this politics possible? For
whom is peace sought in a politics of peace? And, how does the passage
from ethics to politics evidence this ‘whom’? How does the signification
of politics in the face render such a structural and practical understanding possible? Levinas’ own analyses make it clear that the ‘who’ of the
third – simultaneously the who of the Other – is precisely not a question. Levinas’ descriptions of the absoluteness of alterity make it clear
that he brackets the question of the who of the third. The alterity of the
Other is the Other stripped of its contextual marks. Levinas will
famously describe this as the nudity of the face. In an interview with
Philippe Nemo, Levinas will say that
. . . [t]he best way of encountering the Other is not even to notice the color
of his eyes. When one observes the color of the eyes, one is not in a social
relationship with the Other. The relation with the face can surely be dominated by perception, but what is specifically the face is what cannot be
reduced to that. . . . The skin of the face is that which stays most naked,
most destitute. (EI, 79–80/85–6)

This clearly outlines Levinas’ conception of sociality: social relations are
without context and without factical features of particularity. Singularity
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is not perceivable and so does not and cannot manifest particular features of the body. To preserve this sense of sociality, the nudity and destituteness of the skin set aside all signifiers that point alterity to
contextual, factical determinations. Levinas writes elsewhere that the
Other is
. . . [a] uniqueness beyond the individuality of multiple individuals within
their kind. A uniqueness not because of any distinctive sign that would serve
as a specific or individuating difference. A unity prior to any distinctive
sign. . . . A uniqueness that is not forgotten, beneath all the constraints of
Being, History, and the logical forms that hold it in their grip. (DH,
176/117)

Now, this non-perceptual face is the point of passage to politics. So, if
the alterity of the Other is nude, then the third must also signify with
nudity. Nudity of the third, in turn, leads quite logically to a politics
stripped of context. Hence the bareness of the universality of the law.
Given Levinas’ insistence on the identical significative locus of Other and
third, it is surely not too much to say that the descriptive properties of
the face determine the content of what is established on the other side
of the passage: politics. Because the face signifies as absolute uniqueness,
the third cannot carry contextual characteristics over to the content of
a politics of peace. The symmetry of Levinas’ law is directly derived from
the nudity of the face. The law could not signify otherwise.
It is true that this passage puts the totalitarian practice of politics in
question. But it must also be said that it fails to put the traditional idea
of political space into question. Levinas’ political thinking certainly
forgoes war in the name of peace. Nonetheless, peace is maintained in
and by way of the hegemonic work of the universal. The universality
grounded in the rights of the Other establishes an account of universality answerable to the ethical. The call to defend the rights of the Other
alters the character of that answering, and, further, this alteration
imposes law upon voices not wishing for peace. In this sense, I think law
has failed to be dis-interested. Dominance, even when it is domination
with peace, is thoroughly interested. Levinas’ insistence on the wish for
peace conceals how obligation is often demanded in the contestation of
the peace of the moment. Violence can be the only voice of the political
other, but Levinas’ politics of peace cannot hear this voice. Traditional
political space is therefore left safe because the primacy of a fixed universal remains untouched. Peace is maintained in the fixity of law. To
stray from law is to wish not for peace and so not to speak the language
of neighborly love. To stray from law, Levinas would seem to say, does
not put law into question. This is guaranteed, structurally, by the significative structure of the third as nudity. Such a signification does not and
cannot carry contextual markers through the passage to politics. So, it
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is no surprise that Levinas articulates political space as the symmetrical
and neutral space of universal laws. This symmetry of political space
marks Levinas’ account with conservativism in the sense that the idea of
symmetrical political space is not put into question. His description of
the passage from the third to politics also points to a conservative
phenomenological moment. Levinas’ insistence on the nudity of the face,
and so the nudity of the third, fails to feel fully the force of the alterity
of the Other. If, however, we ask who the Other and the third are, then
do we not more radically interrogate the alterity of the Other and others?
That is, have we not asked about what is most other about the Other,
most alter about alterity? If we ask who is the Other and the third, do
we not see another politics? Might this other politics restore the extravagant generosity of ethics to political space?

IV
Let us begin opening the horizon of this other politics. Our basic critical contention thus far has been that Levinas construes political space –
and therefore the passage from ethics to politics – conservatively. This
conservatism derives from the logical connection between the nudity of
the face and the symmetry of the state. Having hesitated before this
passage to and characterization of political space, we are poised to put
forth another question: in what manner is it possible to think political
space otherwise? And, what resources remain in Levinas’ thought for
this thinking otherwise?
To begin this thinking otherwise, let us consider two of Levinas’
remarks on the state. First, although Levinas endorses a conservative
notion of law, he also questions our common assumptions about universality. This questioning may unsettle the conservatism of Levinas’
state. In ‘the state of Israel and the Religion of Israel’, Levinas remarks
that
[w]e need to reflect on the nature of the modern State. . . . The sovereignty
of the State incorporates the universe. In the sovereign State, the citizen may
finally exercise a will. It acts absolutely. Leisure, security, democracy: these
mark the return of a condition, the beginning of a free being. (SIRI, 259–60)

And, second, in ‘Ideology and Idealism’, Levinas will make the following claim, important for thinking about an ethical politics: ‘In the social
community, the community of clothed beings, the privileges of rank
obstruct justice’ (IaI, 243–4; my emphasis). Leisure, security, absolute
act, free being – these are aspects of subjective life that Levinas puts in
question, for they are, in the case of the ethical, preconditions of violence. The question of his success in such putting in question in ethics is

Downloaded from psc.sagepub.com at GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIV LIB on July 17, 2013

03 Drabinski (jr/d) 15/5/00 12:15 pm Page 63

63
Drabinski: The possibility of an ethical politics
tantamount to a judgement of his lifelong philosophical work. But what
limits his ability to question radically these aspects of the symmetrical
state is his reliance on the hegemony of the universal. Political space
unfolds from this universal. What clue is there for another phenomenology of political space?
Levinas’ methodological insistence on the concrete is the most
obvious place to look for such a clue. This insistence returns us to the
immediate and the factual, with all Levinasian qualifications due to those
terms. What seems most apparent about concrete political spatiality is
its asymmetrical distribution. Power, wealth, representation – the elements of political space – all indicate, in concrete human faces, a fundamental lack of symmetry in consolidations of political capital. Levinas’
own reflections would, at times, seem to lead us to such a description.
For, if language is already justice, then what would be the implications
of the following remarks from Totality and Infinity?
Speech is not instituted in a homogeneous or abstract medium, but in a
world where it is necessary to aid and give. It presupposes an I, an existence separated in its enjoyment, which does not welcome empty handed the
face and its voice coming from another shore. Multiplicity in being, which
refuses totalization but takes form as fraternity and discourse, is situated in
essentially asymmetrical ‘space’. (TeI, 191/216)

Multiplicity or political difference in political relations refuses totalization, and so is an indicator of asymmetrical space. Testimony to asymmetry comes from the voice of the Other. Such witness comes from the
site designated or constructed as Other through various elements of
political space. Ellison’s Invisible Man gives us just such a testimony.
Consider Ellison’s reflections on why the invisible man loves the music
of Louis Armstrong – an artist who has ‘made poetry out of being invisible’. Ellison writes that
. . . my own grasp of invisibility aids me to understand his music. . . . Invisibility, let me explain, gives one a slightly different sense of time, you’re never
quite on the beat. Sometimes you’re ahead and sometimes behind. Instead
of the swift and imperceptible flowing of time, you are aware of its nodes,
those points where time stands still or from which it leaps ahead. And you
slip into the breaks and look around. That’s what you hear vaguely in Louis’
music.13

Ellison’s evocation of what falls between rhythm and melody, what interrupts melody at its points of transition, might remind us of Levinas’
claim in ‘La ruine de la représentation’ that alterity interrupts the
rhythms of reflection and representation (RR, 135). Representation,
which plays within the boundaries of the Same, is put in question by
what interrupts. The epistemological and ontological figure of representation is concretized in political space in manifold ways. Democratic
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power and wealth – as ways in which political space is quantified – are
primary sites of political representation. The intimacy of representation
and the question of politics is evident when Levinas says that ‘idealism
completely carried out reduces all ethics to politics’ (TeI, 192/216). If
Ellison’s testimony speaks to anything, it is to the interruption of the
visible Same of political space by the invisible Other of political space.
Now, if we have grounds for thinking political space in its asymmetrical distribution, another question arises: what kind of signification
makes passage from ethics to asymmetrical politics possible? To navigate this passage, we must revisit the question ‘Who is the third?’
without the prejudices Levinas brings to it. To reopen the question
without prejudice is to trouble the purity of Levinas’ account of the
Other and the third. As we saw above, this is a question Levinas explicitly sets aside. Thus, his analysis needs what we could call a ‘hermeneutic supplement’. This supplement, however, is not attached to the matters
themselves from the outside, but is already situated on the margins of
Levinas’ descriptions. This supplement, which aims generally at radicalizing the alterity of the Other and the third, restores the way in which
the third intervenes not as singular, but as an other marked by its social
context. Asking ‘Who is the third?’ reinscribes context into the manifestation of the face by questioning, not only the fact that the Other/third
accuses, but, further, in what manner the Other/third sets out accusation.
Reinscription of context into the signification of the face returns us
to what Irigaray, with regard to the question of sexed bodies, has called
the ‘irreducible non-substitutability’ of difference.14 For Irigaray, difference is what makes ethics possible. But inattentiveness to how difference
is inscribed on the very flesh of the face risks forgetting what is most
other about the Other, most different about difference. If we – unlike
Levinas, but inspired by him – take the socio-political context of signification seriously, then we cannot simply generate a transferable notion
of alterity. As Irigaray’s work on law and sexual difference has shown,
non-substitutability already puts the neutrality and universality of law
into question. Non-substitutability, which arises out of recontextualizing the face and third, is born not of a political agenda, but of the very
idea of the concrete other. The materiality of the face – recall here that
Levinas says materiality describes responsibility – manifests the marks
of culture: gender, race, class and that embarrassing etc. The socio-political context of signification, which renders alterity non-transferable, is
concretely expressed in the materiality of the face. The hermeneutic supplement, then, comes concretely from the expressive horizons of alterity. The accusing Other and third accuse me simultaneously as
singularities and as raced/classed/gendered bodies. The effect of this
signification is a ruining of the neutrality and universality inherent in
the conservative construal of law. This opens the door for thinking
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politically about what, in the context of ethics, Levinas calls a responsible humanism rooted in the anarchical (HA, 90–1/138). Such a modality of signification and accusation also retrieves a sense of contextuality
– one that does not signal a philosophy of the neuter, but one that alters
alterity. This retrieval widens the very otherness of the Other.
Further, this material signification recontextualizes the body of the
subject put under obligation. The accusing face always accuses a moi
that is in some manner substantial. It is helpful in this context to recall
Levinas’ trope that the subject is accused ‘in its skin’. ‘In responsibility,’
Levinas writes, ‘as one assigned or elected from the outside, assigned as
irreplaceable, the subject is accused in its skin’ (AE, 134/106). The
embodied moi, the responsible subject, is exposed to the Other, not as
conscience alone, but always as a body. The aim of this formulation is
to conceive the responsible body without the possibility of evasion (AE,
139/109). Exposure of the body in its skin exposes the body of the moi
in its singularity. But, at the same time, do we not have to say that it
exposes the body, as we said above about the face, with its social, contextual markers? Does it really make sense to say I am accused by the
Other without accounting for the gendered, raced and classed character
of that accusation? Indeed, in moral ‘experience’, it is indisputable that
these characters of the body accused determine the terms of obligation
and the work of the call. Do these very characteristics not compose the
concrete content of my being for-the-Other and therefore for-the-Third?
Could we not derive this from Levinas’ (qualified) affirmation of
Merleau-Ponty’s notion that the body has a history? Is this history not
brought into relief in obligation itself, where I can evade neither obligation nor the history of my exposed body? To be accused in a raced,
gendered, classed, etc., body is to be called to answer in some (infinite)
manner to that history.
If we can legitimately claim that contextuality widens the sense of
obligation in ethics, then there are consequences for how we think about
the passage to politics. What is most significant about this contextualization of alterity is that such marks alter, quite profoundly, the logic of
transition from the face and third to politics. One can no longer safely
think political space in terms of the anchored universality of law. Rather,
with the passage to asymmetrical political space, negotiated through the
contextual Other and third, a new set of political demands is presented.
These demands exceed not only the singularity of the Other via the third,
but also the singularity of the I. I am called to answer in this political
space to historical exigencies of our, not simply my, sociality. Response
to this responsibility cannot take place under the universality of law. The
historical exigencies of race, class, gender, etc., call for a response within
the non-universal and unique character of the demands issuing from our
history. ‘Our’ history does not refer to the history of a unified, collective
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I. This history refers to the agonistic interplay of socialities through
which various modes of representation have determined political space
as violence. This violent representation is the medium in which an ethically responsive politics must take place. This is asymmetrical political
space.
Asymmetrical political space makes it possible to articulate an
ethical politics, which in turn allows us to exceed the neutrality of political space deemed conservative in Levinas’ politics of peace. The central
problem of an ethical politics, then, is how to make sense of an extravagant generosity within the asymmetry of political spatiality. This generosity is legitimated when the passage from ethics to politics is altered
by the contextual marks of the I, Other and third party. The politics indicated by this passage takes place in asymmetrical space, a space of representation and violence, and so bears within it the possibility of the
generosity of the ethical. This political generosity can be culled from the
term Levinas gives to the work of ethics: liturgy. Liturgy is the moment
in which work accedes to the ethical. Ethics and its duties are taken up
in liturgy.15 If ethics is accomplished in the infinite work of liturgy, then
an ethical politics must also be liturgical. In the context of politics, the
insertion of the word ‘liturgy’ is particularly productive. The word must
be thought in two intertwined ways. First, liturgy must be understood
in the sense Levinas gives it in ‘Trace of the Other’, translating the Greek
with the provocative phrase ‘expenditure of funds at a loss’. Second,
liturgy must also be thought, in the political context, in terms of its traditional translation: ‘public works’. The latter, which Levinas’ translation overlooks, reminds us of the political context of liturgical work.
Giving is not simply ethical. In asymmetrical political space, giving is
public. Its generous work is made possible by the institutions and laws
of the ethical state. Liturgy, conceived in asymmetrical political space,
reclaims the political. Liturgical giving in political space calls for a generosity that takes place, not between singularities, but in and through
public works. This generosity is enacted in the responsive transformation of political institutions in, quite literally, the face of others: the
movement from peace to liturgy. This movement makes the transition
from ethics to politics without reducing the dimension of transcendence.
This is precisely what Levinas’ political thought has always sought to
accomplish.
The demands of liturgy – the responsibilities of politics – are certainly necessary for an ethical politics, but are not wholly sufficient. For,
to speak of the work of liturgy is to speak of a world in which giving is
possible, as well as of the concrete content of that giving. Regarding the
latter, the sense of this giving is context-dependent, an-archical, and so
subject to the exigencies of an historically concrete moment. We can,
however, briefly consider two general aspects of this giving: democratic
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political power and wealth. Democracy and wealth are perhaps the most
important sites of asymmetry in political life. They are, to be blunt, sites
of representation and disturbing violence, and so provide important sites
of demand, expenditure and public work. Also, these two aspects of
giving are particularly relevant because they both represent a distribution of power in political space based on a quantification of the world.
It is therefore important to recall Levinas’ comments in ‘Ego and Totality’ that justice is only possible on the basis of a quantification of the
world. ‘The quantification of man’, Levinas writes, ‘points to a new
justice’ (MT, 51/45). The quantification of political space is thus not a
question of a violence set between faces, but the condition for the possibility of a liturgical response, of responsible sociality, and so of an
ethical politics. Let us sketch something of the impact of this politics on
democracy.
According to Critchley, the ethical sense of Levinas’ transition to
politics allows us to see democracy as ethics in practice. That is, in the
case of democracy, we see ethics put into political practice in the sense
that democracy, like the Same by the Other, is always power put in question. As Critchley puts it,
I understand democracy to be an ethically grounded form of political life
which is continually being called into question by asking of its legitimacy
and the legitimacy of its practices and institutions: what is justice? In this
sense, legitimate communities are those which have themselves in question. . . . Democracy is the form of society committed to the political equality of all its citizens and the ethical inequality of myself faced with the
Other.16

Democratic life is put in question by contestations of power through, for
example, elections, activism and debate. To be sure, this is sufficient for
the ethical dimension of a politics of peace. However, a liturgical politics may demand something more radical. Relegation of the ethical sense
of politics to abstract mechanisms of power is not sufficiently concrete,
for it appeals to a structure that does not give when put in question. But
democracy does represent. Democracy quantifies the world of political
power through representations of selves and others. This quantification
is fecund when we consider how quantification of power makes giving
possible – that is, how the consolidation of relations derived from democratic work puts in question those who emerge victorious. Liturgy here
calls for a giving of political power without reciprocity. To take the
practice of democracy in the USA, this giving calls for a rethinking of
how democratic power is distributed. In opposition to a majority rule
democracy, the centerpiece of the US system of democracy, a liturgical
politics literally calls for a giving of political power responsive to the
inequality of myself/ourselves faced with the Other. Liturgical politics as
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democracy would therefore call for a distribution of political power that
does not solidify the majority. Rather, this democracy calls for a nonreciprocal, redistributive giving to the other of democratic space: the
minority. And surely this redistribution is subject to the movement of
history, to social change, and so lacks the sort of arche typically
demanded of a foundation. The an-archic dimension of this redistribution is not a limitation of liturgy, but its very fund and the very condition of generosity.
The same sort of consequences hold for wealth. The asymmetry of
wealth distribution under capitalist systems is put in question by the
others of political space. If an ethical politics modeled on liturgy requires
that we think of democracy as expenditure of political representation at
a loss, then we must see distributions of wealth according to the same
demands. The quantification of the world in money is treated by Levinas
with some care in ‘Ego and Totality’, but we need to begin to think
through the same issue liturgically. If the quantification of the world in
money leads us to a new justice – here, a redistributive justice – we arrive
at a new conception of taxation and possession. The public work of taxation is this quantification. The exigent responsibility of expenditure of
these funds at a loss is therefore the justice of a liturgical politics. The
collection and distribution of wealth is thereby infused with moral
weight. Wealth is the site of my/our violence to the other(s), the possibility of my/our giving, and so of meeting the other(s) without empty
hands. The asymmetry of wealth distribution, inherent in the facticity of
capitalist political life, transforms that dimension of political space. The
moral weight of unequal distributions of wealth shifts political space
from a kind of neutrality to outright violence. The liturgical response to
this political responsibility, which is signified concretely by the contextual other and third, gives without expectation of return. Rather, I am
called to sacrifice my full hands for the others. Wealth quantifies the
world and exposes my hands as full. It also exposes how my full hands
usurp the place of the Other and others. One could, I think call this
giving, this liturgical justice, a kind of political sainteté.17
Based on this sketch of some consequences of a liturgical politics,
we can return to Levinas’ remark that privileges of rank obstruct justice.
This remark indicates that there are resources and impulses already in
Levinas for a redistributive politics. Redistribution, conceived in the
context of liturgy, is responsive to the demands made in asymmetrical
political space. This is most decidedly not a politics of reciprocity. The
redistributive gift manifests a giving without return. The difficulty of this
duty of redistribution ultimately lies in the undecidable, contextual character of political responsibility, as well as the difficulty of accounting, in
the Levinasian context, for the identities constitutive of political relations. But we must always decide within this undecidability – within the
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an-archy of political responsibility – for an extravagant generosity, and
not merely for the neutrality of law. An-archy is the fund from which
obligation arises in ethics. So too is it the fund from which a responsible political response must arise. If the neutrality of law fails to recognize the weight of this an-archy, then should not peace give way to
liturgy?
A liturgical politics makes it possible to think concretely about an ethical
politics beyond the politics of peace. The expenditure of funds at a loss
in public works – both senses of liturgy thought at once – ruins the petrified idols of violence that have come to dominate political life in the
USA: the idols of a certain kind of democratic representation and capitalist conceptions of wealth accumulation. This ruining work opens the
possibility of a further rapprochement between Levinas and Marx, a reconciliation already begun in the work of Robert Gibbs and Simon
Critchley18 and indicated in various remarks Levinas makes regarding
the idea of a communism (distinct from Marxist science and the brutal
practices of Stalinism).19 An ethical politics also opens up a new conception of political temporality. Irigaray captures the sense of this new
temporality in J’aime à toi:
Respect for the negative, the play of the dialectic between us, would enable
us to remain ourselves (demeurer soi) and to create an œuvre with the other.
And thus to develop, building a temporality instead of believing in eternal
promises. We can construct a History on the basis of an interiority without
power.20

Respect for the negative is best manifest in a liturgical politics. Respect,
ethics, must be concrete – without the utopia of eternal promises. The
extravagant generosity of liturgy must interrupt the rhythms of political
life, which introduces a politics answerable to what Catherine Chalier
has called the ‘utopia of the human’.21 The demand for respect in liturgy
is made by the contextually characterized third, the ethico-political subjectivity it initiates, and so the third and subjectivity marked by their
place/non-place in political space. This demand accuses me in a skin that
is at once nude and clothed. The moi is singular and social. To be so
accused by the third is to feel the force of an alterity both unique and
political. Is this not what it would mean not only to feel the force of an
alterity in me, but also to respond to the idea of the infinite in us?
Grand Valley State University, Department of Philosophy,
Allendale, MI, USA
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et Heidegger. Paris: Vrin, 1988.
SIRI ‘The state of Israel and the Religion of Israel’, trans. Seàn Hand, in The
Levinas Reader, ed. Seàn Hand. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990.
TeI
Totalité et infini. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961; Totality and
Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1992.

Notes
1 See the work of Gillian Rose for a vivid example of this criticism, most
recently in her Mourning Becomes the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996). Rose’s criticisms overlook the fact that Levinas will
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6
7

consistently insist on the necessity of the ‘Greek’ when it comes to the case
of politics. While this does not directly address the sense of Rose’s appeal
to a ‘third’ city beneath the ruins of Athens and Jerusalem, it does, I think,
bring Levinas and Rose into a proximity she perhaps does not anticipate.
Again, the work of Gillian Rose is exemplary in this regard. See her
sustained criticism of the ethics/politics disjunct and her remarks on the
problem of the third party in The Broken Middle: Out of our Ancient
Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 270–96. See also Charles Scott’s On
the Advantages and Disadvantages of Ethics and Politics (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1996), Chapter 11. Rose and Scott are by no
means cohorts in critique. Despite the fact that both are suspicious of
Levinas’ account of politics, Rose argues for a politics ‘below’ ethics, while
Scott remains suspicious of both ethics and politics. A recent article has
gone so far as to conclude that ‘the privilege accorded to absolute alterity
in Levinas leads to an inability to support political action’, which of course
fails to take into account Levinas’ own efforts, often very nuanced, in that
direction. See Ed Wingenbach, ‘Liberating Responsibility: The Levinasian
Ethic of Being and Time’, International Philosophical Quarterly XXXVI(1)
(March 1996): 29–46.
In A l’Heure des Nations, Levinas will remark: ‘What is Europe? It is the
Bible and the Greeks’ (AHN, 128/133). See also an interview with Florian
Rötzer, conducted in German, where Levinas remarks, ‘Europe, that’s the
Bible and the Greeks’, and links this simultaneity with the question of
justice (‘Emmanuel Levinas’, in Französische Philosophen im Gespräch, ed.
Florian Rötzer [Munich: Boer Verlag, 1986], pp. 93 ff.; ‘Emmanuel
Levinas’, in Conversations with French Philosophers, trans. Gary
Ayelsworth [Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1995], p. 60). What
is most interesting about the latter interview is that Levinas insists that the
necessity of the state does not, and indeed cannot, dispense with the relation
of goodness with the Other. So, universality and law (in a word, justice) are
always bound to singularity and goodness. Explicating this binding is the
task of the present essay.
Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, p. 37.
ibid.; my emphasis.
Cf., for example, ibid., p. 36.
Here my description of Levinas’ account of the relation between ethics and
politics will run counter to that of Simon Critchley, who contends that ‘the
third party ensures that the ethical relation always takes place within a
political context, within the political realm’ (The Ethics of Deconstruction:
Derrida and Levinas [Oxford: Blackwell, 1992], p. 225). This remark puts
the case too strongly. While Critchley is correct that Levinas situates ethics
and politics in a common significative locus (the face of the Other), we will
not claim that ethics takes place within the public realm. Rather, it is quite
the contrary. Politics (the politics of peace) is set out from the ethical, and
the intertwining of the face and the third is commanded as much by Levinas’
methodological allegiance to the principle of concretion as it is by the
matters of politics. We cannot, however, go to the opposite extreme of
Critchley and claim, as Brian Schroeder does, that for Levinas ‘the ethical
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is prior to and “better” than the political’ (Altared Ground [New York:
Routledge, 1996], pp. 102–3, also p. 72). Schroeder underestimates how
seriously Levinas takes the articulation of a politics of peace and how in
that context law may be configured as the protection of the Other.
IaI, 247–8 and also see the parallel remarks concluding ‘Peace and
Proximity’. With the phrase homo homini lupus, Levinas is recalling
Hobbes’ famed question posed to William, Earl of Devonshire, in the 1855
dedication of De Cive. The phrase is of course originally from Plautus’
Asinaria. We might suspect that Levinas has in mind Freud, who employs
the phrase in Civilization and its Discontents, but in an interview from 1988
Levinas uses the same phrase – translated into French on this occasion –
and invokes Hobbes’ authorship. See ‘Responsabilité et substitution’, in
Augusto Ponzio, Sujet et altérité sur Emmanuel Levinas (Paris: Editions
L’Harmattan, 1996), p. 141.
In our own formulations, we will use the phrase ‘rights of the human’ to
avoid the gender exclusive ‘man’. But it is important to note that this alteration, though in accord with current literary convention, is not without
dangers. It covers over the important link, for Levinas, between politics and
illeity. This connection is linked of course to the masculine il, which is a
problematic unto itself and cannot be adequately treated here. On this issue,
see Simonne Plourde, Emmanuel Levinas: Altérité et responsabilité (Paris:
Editions du Cerf, 1996), pp. 127–48; she outlines both the linguistic and
the temporal aspects of illeity, attempting to show how immemoriality
‘takes root in the surprising human fraternity’ (p. 141). See also John
Llewelyn, Emmanuel Levinas: Genealogy of Ethics (New York: Routledge,
1995), pp. 209 ff., for another sort of structural account. Llewelyn attempts
to negotiate a path around the simple identification of illeity with masculine
privilege by pointing out that, according to Levinas’ logic, ‘it must be
emphasized that the trace of the other [the He-ism of illeity] passes also
through the She-ism and elleity of maternity, so through a non-neutral
illelleity’ (p. 209). I must thank John Llewelyn for alerting me, in numerous
personal conversations, to this problem of substituting ‘human’ for ‘man’
and s/he for ‘he’ in Levinas’ work.
Critchley, Ethics of Deconstruction, p. 233.
ibid., p. 227. The obvious gender exclusiveness that comes with the term
‘fraternity’ is a significant problem, one that comes also with the question
of ‘illeity’ mentioned above in note 9. This problem entails the wider issue
of Levinas’ problematic use of the feminine and the patriarchal privilege
that use betrays. Such issues take us afield from the immediate task at hand,
but we should note that they have an enormous impact on both the ethics
of Levinas’ ethics and the politics of the same. See Tina Chanter’s Ethics of
Eros (New York: Routledge, 1995), Chapter 5 for a rigorous and critical
examination of the role of sex/gender in Levinas’ ethics (and by extension
his politics). Her reading of Levinas, and especially of Irigaray’s critique of
Levinas, is uniquely sensitive to the complexities of the issue, which in turn
yields a sophisticated account of both the feminine in Levinas and the future
of an ethics of alterity.
At this point, one may note how this impacts on Levinas’ quiet, yet lifelong,
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13
14
15
16
17

18

19
20
21

polemic against Hegel. In the Grundlinien, Hegel will describe political
subjectivity in terms of the ‘patriot’. Hegel writes: ‘This is the secret of the
patriotism of the citizens [das Geheimnis des Patriotismus der Bürger] in
the sense that they know state as their substance, for it is the state which
supports their particular spheres and the legal recognition, authority, and
welfare of these’ (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts [Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp, 1982], p. 458; Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen
Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991],
pp. 329–30). Levinas’ articulation of the genetic priority and resistance of
ethics to politics effectively reverses the Hegelian logic of the state, without
eschewing the idea of law.
Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man (New York: Vintage Books, 1947), p. 8; my
emphasis.
Cf. Luce Irigaray, ‘Questions to Emmanuel Levinas’, in The Irigaray
Reader, ed. Margaret Whitford (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) p. 185 (question
six).
Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, ‘Dialogue: Œuvre et Altérité’, in Ponzio, Sujet et
altérité sur Emmanuel Levinas, p. 150.
Critchley, Ethics of Deconstruction, p. 239.
In numerous places Levinas will define sainteté as being called to ‘sacrifice’
for the other. See, for example, his ‘Avant-propos’ to Entre Nous (Paris:
Editions Grasset, 1991), p. 11 and the interview ‘Responsabilité et substitution’, in Ponzio, Sujet et altérité, p. 143.
See, for example, Robert Gibbs, Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), Chapter 10 and Simon
Critchley, ‘On Derrida’s Specters of Marx’, Philosophy and Social Criticism
21(3) (1995): 12–19.
See Levinas’ remarks in ‘Ideology and Idealism’ on Marxism as a ‘prophetic
cry’ (in De Dieu qui vient à l’idée [Paris: Vrin, 1992], p. 19; IaI, 238) and
on Stalinism and the meaning of Marxism at IEI, 197 f.
Luce Irigaray, J’aime à toi: Esquisse d’une félicité dans l’histoire (Paris:
Editions Grasset, 1992), p. 231; I Love to You: Sketch of a Possible Felicity
in History, trans. Alison Martin (New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 148.
Catherine Chalier, Levinas: L’utopie de l’humain (Paris: Albin Michel,
1993). Chalier is playing on Levinas’ scattered remarks regarding the idea
of a utopia without eternity. Levinas will write, for example, that ethics
transformed as justice conceives a subjectivity that says ‘here I am for the
others’, thereby ‘[losing] his place radically, or his shelter in being, to enter
into ubiquity which is also a utopia’ (AE, 233/185). Or elsewhere, Levinas
will remark that ‘[t]his concern for the other remains utopian in the sense
that it is always “out of place” (u-topos) in this world, always other than
the “ways of the world”; but there are many examples of it in the world’
(IEI, 197).
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